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Abstract
The formal verification of mathematical texts is one of the most interesting applications for com-
puter systems. In fact, we argue that the expert language of mathematics is the natural choice for
achieving efficient mathematician–machine interaction. Our empirical approach, the analysis of care-
fully authored textbook proofs, forces us to focus on the language and the reasoning pattern that
mathematician use when presenting proofs to colleagues and students. Enabling a machine to un-
derstand and follow such language and argumentation is seen to be the key to usable and acceptable
math assistant systems. In this paper, we first perform an analysis of three textbook proofs by hand;
we then describe a computational framework that aims at mechanising such an analysis. The result-
ing proof-of-concept implementation is capable of processing simple textbook proofs and constitutes
promising steps towards a natural mathematician–machine interface for proof development and ver-
ification.
© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Automated reasoning is one of the most established disciplines in informatics and
artificial intelligence, and formal methods become increasingly employed in practical ap-
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specific areas (e.g., the verification of correctness properties of software and hardware
specifications) and areas close to informatics such as computational linguistics (e.g., the
computation of consistency and informativeness properties of semantic representations).
Naturally, there is also a potential for practical applications in the area of mathematics:
the generation of proofs for mathematically interesting and motivated theorems and, quite
associated, the computer-supported formalisation of mathematics. These applications are
supported by theoretical results. Research in modern logic has established that all of math-
ematics is reducible to axiomatic set theory and that in principle, mathematical proofs can
be reproduced in this system completely formally in the sense of mechanical verifiability.
Moreover, one can search for each mathematical proof of a theorem in a mechanical way. It
is a matter of fact, however, that mathematicians rarely use computer-support for the con-
struction and verification of mathematical arguments. We believe that this is, in large part,
caused by the “unnaturalness” of the language and the reasoning that such proof engines
support.
In the past, researchers in the area of automated reasoning have focused their work on
formalisms and algorithms that allow for the construction and verification of proofs that
are written in a formal-logical language and that only use a limited number of inference
rules. For the computer scientist, such formal proofs have the advantage of a simple and
ambiguous-free syntax, which can thus be easily processed. Moreover, the limited number
of inference rules has a direct impact on the complexity of the search space that needs to
be conquered during the process of constructing proofs. The verification of given formal
proofs is greatly facilitated by the complete explicitness of their logical argumentation
where no reasoning step is left out.
For mathematicians, however, such formal proofs are usually hard to understand. For
them, they are written in an unfamiliar and artificial language and much too detailed.
Moreover, the sheer number of inference steps, while logically relevant, describe only
trivial mathematical details and make it difficult to follow a proof’s main underlying ar-
gumentation line. In practise, thus, mathematicians use proof generation engines rather
seldom, if at all. The same is true with regard to proof verification tools. The amount of
work that is required to verify a mathematical proof with such tools is considerable, if
not prohibitive. Since proof verification systems only accept formal proofs as input, the
mathematician’s first task is to manually translate the mathematical proof into the formal
language that is accepted by the verifier. This in turn includes the translation of the proof’s
mathematical argumentation into inference rules that are supported by the proof engine.
Such translations and refinements are usually very time consuming, tedious, and prone to
error themselves. Hence, how the proof verifier then judges the result of proof translation
and proof refinement is only of limited relevance to the original mathematical proof. From
the mathematician’s point of view, there is thus a need for a proof verifier that is capable
of processing informal proofs automatically.
Such a system would have an enormous potential in the community of mathematics, and
this potential has been recognised early. In the beginning of the 1960s, John McCarthy, one
of the pioneers of artificial intelligence, remarked that “[c]hecking mathematical proofs is
potentially one of the most interesting and useful applications of automatic computers”
[29]. More than forty years thereafter, a tool that supports mathematicians with the verifi-
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is associated with research questions within the disciplines of automated reasoning and
computational linguistics that are still only partially answered.
Our research work aims at contributing towards the realisation of a verifier for mathe-
matical proofs. It attempts to provide a general framework as well as an implementation for
such a proof engine. The resulting system specification exploits techniques of automated
theorem proving and discourse processing. The remainder of this paper is structured as
follows. In Section 2, we describe current approaches to proof construction and verifica-
tion as well as steps towards improving mathematician-machine interaction. In Section 3,
we analyse the expert language and reasoning of three exemplary textbook proofs. In Sec-
tion 4, we discuss our computational framework for a textbook proof verifier aiming at
mechanising the task we described in the earlier section. In Section 5, we relate our work
to others; Section 6 summarises our findings and concludes.
2. Background
There are two classes of proof machines: those that search for proofs autonomously, and
those that require human expertise to guide their search.
2.1. Automated theorem provers
Automated theorem provers perform proof construction without human intervention;
the user’s role is restricted to supplying a formalised problem statement. However, expert
users who are aware of system internals (e.g., proof strategies) or who anticipate critical
arguments to be used as part of the proof will be able to provide guidance to restrict the
prover’s search space, for instance, by setting-up the problem statement appropriately or
by tuning the system’s parameters. Provers that represent the current state-of-the-art in
automated theorem proving include Otter [30] and Spass [43].
Despite of the tremendous progress in automated theorem proving (ATP), human in-
tervention is usually essential to guide a proof engine through the vast search space of
possible inferences. Their practical applicability to real-life problems is thus quite limited.
However, automated theorem provers could effectively be employed as the back-end of
human-assisted proof construction systems, especially if resulting formal proofs can be
post-processed to make them more accessible to mathematicians.
2.2. Interactive proof development systems
There are two main approaches towards the interactive generation and verification of
formal proofs. In both approaches, mathematicians are given tools that assist them with
proof construction, in particular, with maintaining proof obligations and with ensuring
continuing correctness of the developing proof. The primary difference between these two
approaches is rooted in when and how users and machines interact with each other. In a
third and most recent approach, the proof engine attempts to automate high-level reasoning
as much as possible. Only at the critical points of the argument, where it is necessary to
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and expertise is called for and facilitated.
2.2.1. The compiler approach
In the first approach, the compiler approach, or declarative approach, the user is re-
quired to give a full and explicit construction of a mathematical argument; the proof system
then checks, or compiles, the user input for correctness and either signals acceptance or re-
jection, in which case errors in syntax, type, and reasoning are appropriately marked.
Automath [12,32] and Mizar [36,38] are the most influential representatives of such
proof engines. In Automath a piece of mathematics is called a book, which itself consists of
a sequence of lines. Each line is either axiomatic, definitional, assertional, or assumptional.
Automath does not supply compound inference steps, so proof construction is very explicit
and tedious. Furthermore, the readability of Automath content is reduced by the use of a
formal language that bears a close resemblance to an assembler programming language.
A well-known example of a large formalisation task is van Benthem–Jutting’s hand trans-
lation of Landau’s ‘Grundlagen der Analysis’ [26] into aut-qe, one of the formalisms of
the Automath-language family [39]. This was the first effort to present a non-trivial part of
mathematics in a formally-checkable format.
Mizar has several advantages when compared to Automath. The Mizar language is an ef-
fort to mimic the language of informal mathematics, and therefore allows for much richer
linguistic constructions than any of the Automath languages. Due to its expressiveness, for-
malised mathematics in Mizar is much easier to read than in Automath. In addition, while
the Mizar proof checker insists on rigorous lines of reasoning, it has the capability to fill-in
some trivial inferences. Another positive point of Mizar is that it offers a large body of
already formalised mathematics. This allows Mizar users to start proving theorems without
excessive preparatory work. Formalised theories and their proven theorems are all pub-
lished in the Journal of Formalised Mathematics (cf. http://mizar.org/JFM/). At the time
of writing, the Mizar library of formalised mathematics contains well over 2000 definitions
and 20 000 proven theorems in numerous theories. Despite of all the positive features, how-
ever, Mizar proofs are often perceived as “too formal”, as too far away from the informal
proofs of mathematical textbooks. Developing a Mizar proof is far from trivial. In addi-
tion to an expertise in mathematics, it requires an adherence to formal rigour and a good
knowledge of Mizar’s language, type inference, proof checker, and library.
2.2.2. The interpreter approach
In the second approach, the interpreter approach, or procedural approach, a human user
and the proof system co-construct the formal proof incrementally. Ideally, the mathemati-
cian only needs to contribute his expertise at the critical points of the argument, i.e., guiding
the system through “tricky” proof steps; this leaves the machine with carrying out routine
tasks. With regard to the large majority of interactive proof engines, however, the user has
a set of proof construction commands at hand and asks the system to apply them. The sys-
tem keeps track of the proof obligations and guarantees that the so constructed proof is
correct. Exemplary representatives of computer-assisted proof engines include Nuprl [11],
Coq [15], and Isabelle [33].
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that maps a goal, or proof obligation, into a list of subgoals. A tactic can be an elementary
inference step (e.g., each of the introduction and elimination rules of Gentzen’s sequent
calculus can be encoded as an elementary tactic), or complex, combining elementary infer-
ence steps into larger units, possibly with the help of combinators, or tacticals (expressing
alternation, sequencing, and iteration). Users can, of course, define their own (hopefully
valid) tactics. Tactics are a huge advantage since their application greatly modularises,
structures, and facilitates proof development.
While Mizar’s proof automation is relatively poor, Isabelle, for instance, allows users to
delegate non-trivial tasks to the machine. Isabelle provides “try everything” tactics (e.g.,
apply(auto)) that break up and try to prove all remaining subgoals, either by success-
fully calling a simplifier or a classical ATP back-engine. However, such proof automation
suffers from two dangers. First, if the back-engine can handle a given proof obligation, the
user might not be able to understand the resulting formal argument—and sometimes, the
user seeks not only a guarantee but an explanation as well. Second, if the back-engine does
not manage to complete an assignment, the user might have lost track of the argument too.
As a matter of fact, current proof environments do not make it easy for users to diagnose
the reason for their failure, although such an analysis is necessary for enabling effective
human intervention.
The Isar language [44,45] extends Isabelle’s procedural tactics scripting with structured
proofs in a stylised (Mizar-like) language of mathematics.1 The Isar extension to Isabelle
makes it essentially follow the declarative approach to proof construction. The Isabelle/Isar
version of the Proof General [2] provides a comfortable editor for interactive theory and
proof development, blurring the differences between the interpreter approach and the com-
piler approach.
2.2.3. The proof planning approach
The tactics technology of LCF-based systems allows users to capture and group com-
mon pattern of inference into a compound inference rule, or tactic. The execution of
such high-level argumentation schemes greatly facilitates proof construction. However, the
mathematician’s role is still the one of a proof construction worker who has to select the
next construction site (i.e., the next goal node) and the (standard or customised) building
block (system-defined or user-defined tactic) whose application to a goal node generates
subgoals. Because tactics may come in substantial numbers, this places quite a burden on
the user of tactics-based systems. To make things worse, tactics vary from system to sys-
tem; their system-variance is often due to system-specific unification as well as type and
proof search mechanisms.
Proof planning attempts to support and mechanise the builder’s work, synergising hu-
man mathematical expertise and intuition with machine computational power [8]. A plan
operator, or proof plan schema, consists of a name, an input goal, a set of preconditions,
a set of postconditions, a set of output goals, and an associated tactic that, if executed
successfully, maps the input goal to the output subgoals. Such schemata are thus more
1 In [46], Wenzel and Wiedijk give a good comparison of the mathematical proof languages Mizar and Isar.
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structure, but also on other parts of the proof context (prior context and anticipated fu-
ture proof context). An induction schema, for instance, could have a precondition that tests
whether rippling, a goal-directed rewriting strategy [9], is possible in any of the step cases.
Such heuristic information can then be exploited to better look-ahead or divide and conquer
the search space.
There are various implementations of proof planning: mega [5], Oyster/Clam [10],
λ-Clam [34], and IsaPlanner [14]. In the Oyster/Clam system, Clam builds a proof plan
customised for the current conjecture and then uses this plan to instruct Oyster, a (tactics-
based) theorem prover, how to prove the theorem. All the search is conducted during proof
planning; the execution of the proof plan requires no search. XBarnacle provides a graph-
ical front-end to Clam allowing a user to interact during the proof planning process [28].
As part of developing Oyster/Clam, a large corpus of expert knowledge has been acquired
and encoded as proof plan schemata. Furthermore, heuristics for lemma speculation and
generalisation have been developed and implemented. Unlike other proof machines, Oys-
ter/Clam is also capable of reporting on the cause of proof failure by using its proof critic
and patch facility [23].
Using proof planning it has been possible to automate more of the proof discovery
process than is usually possible. Proof plans also provide a better basis for user interaction
since the state of the proof can be described and controlled at a higher level; a crucial issue
for the construction of complex mathematical arguments that require human intervention.
2.3. A critique of pure reasoning
The tremendous progress in computer-assisted theorem proving has lead to applications
in areas where the existence of formal proof is crucial, for instance, in the verification of
the correctness of software and hardware specifications. In mathematics, however, proof
development systems have been much less successful. Mathematicians are put-off by the
huge preparatory effort they need to invest to produce formal proof: getting familiar with
formalised theories that constitute the formal working context and, non-negligible, learning
to read and extend such theories using a given proof environment’s language and reasoning
mechanism. Moreover, formal proof is not seen as a necessary condition (for success)
among mathematicians. As Hanna, for instance, points out, “[the] acceptance of a theorem
by practising mathematicians is a social process which is more a function of understanding
and significance than of rigorous proof” [20].
Previous efforts in the computer-assisted theorem proving community focused on mech-
anising reasoning schemes, devising efficient data structures, and directing proof search.
Much less research has been invested into human-oriented proof presentation and com-
munication. As a result, there is a considerable gap between formal proof and informal
proof, which, we believe, inherently hampers any substantial progress in designing effec-
tive mathematician-machine communication. While mathematicians are often not at ease
with a given proof engine’s formalism, they do have precise intuitions about their domain
as well as an effective natural means—namely informal, mathematical proofs—to com-
municate them. The development of a math-oriented proof system, where mathematicians
formulate proofs in their expert language and modes of reasoning, is often regarded as sci-
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mathematical reasoning (tactics) and guided search (proof planning) needs to be comple-
mented with research in modelling the language that mathematicians speak and understand.
In the remainder of this article, we describe our work towards building a machine that
is able to understand informal proofs. This constitutes an interpretative, declarative ap-
proach, where mathematicians start presenting proofs in a paper-pencil-like manner, and
then correct, clarify, or refine their arguments given the proof checker’s reaction.
3. An exemplary analysis of three textbook proofs
In this section, we analyse three proofs taken from textbooks on elementary number the-
ory [21,27]. We start with a study of Hardy & Wright’s proof of their “Theorem 3”, which,
from an automated checking perspective, is quite encouraging. Towards the other end of
what is mechanisable is Hardy & Wright’s proof of the fundamental theorem of arithmetic
(FTA), which shows many challenging aspects. This proof is compared to LeVeque’s proof
of the same theorem, whose argumentation is more accessible to mechanisation.
Notation Hardy & Wright define the highest common divisor d of two integers a and b,
not both zero, as the largest positive integer which divides both a and b, and write d =
(a, b). Moreover, Hardy & Wright express the fact that a is divisible by b, or b is a divisor
of a, by b|a. The expression a/|b is equivalent to ¬a | b. We use the symbol Z to denote the
set of integers . . . ,−3,−2,−1,0,1,2, . . . , and the symbol N to denote the non-negative
integers 0,1,2,3, . . . .
3.1. Hardy & Wright’s Theorem 3
Consider the mathematical argument in Fig. 1, which proves Theorem 3 of Hardy &
Wright’s textbook [21, p. 21]. The theorem statement is followed by three proof sentences
that build a quite complex net of argument interdependencies. A disclosure of its logical
structure will need to include the identification, quantification, and scope of the variables
it contains; its assumptions and their scope; and the conclusions that can be derived from
them.
THEOREM 3 (EUCLID’S FIRST THEOREM). If p is prime, and p | ab, then p | a
or p | b.
Suppose that p is prime and p | ab. If p/| a then (a,p) = 1, and therefore, by
Theorem 24, there are an x and a y for which xa + yp = 1 or
xab + ypb = b.
But p | ab and p | pb, and therefore p | b.
Fig. 1. Hardy & Wright’s proof of Theorem 3.
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reading is given to the right-hand side of the initial proof state:
Δ ∪ {}  ∀p∈N∀a∈N∀b∈N . prime(p) ∧ p | ab → p | a ∨ p | b.
Each of the theorem’s variables is universally quantified. Its proof will show that the con-
clusion p | a ∨p | b solely depends on the premise prime(p)∧p | ab, given an underlying
mathematical theory Δ and an empty set of hypotheses. For the subsequent discussion,
theory Δ shall include at least these lemmata:
(1)∀a∈N∀b∈N∀c∈N . (a, b) = c → ∃x∈Z∃y∈Z.xa + yb = c,
(2)∀a∈N∀b∈N . prime(a) ∧ ¬a|b → (a, b) = 1,
(3)∀a∈N∀b∈N∀d∈N . d|a → d|ab,
(4)∀a∈N∀b∈N∀d∈N∀x∈N∀y∈N . d|a ∧ d|b → d|(xa + yb),
(5)∀a∈N∀b∈N∀x∈N . x|a ∧ a = b → x|b.
The first important fact that a proof reader must realise is that the scope of the quantifiers
for p, a, and b does not extend beyond the theorem statement. Hardy & Wright, following
common practise in mathematical writing, omit to start their proof with a statement equiv-
alent to “Now, let p, a, and b be arbitrary natural numbers”; instead their use of the names
a, b, and p in the theorem fore-shadows their respective use as free variables in the proof.2
The first proof sentence is the beginning of an inter-sentential conditional. Its cue “sup-
pose” must get wide scope, and thus, a complex assumption is added to the (currently
empty) list of hypotheses of the proof state. The first part of the second sentence shares the
linguistic surface form of the theorem statement. Meta-mathematical knowledge, however,
informs us that its semantic and pragmatic function is different. Here, the symbols p and
a in the conditional are not universally quantified but free variables. Moreover, the if-then
statement does not assert a statement of the form A → B but adds an assumption A (p/| a)
to the argument’s hypotheses; and then concludes that B ((a,p) = 1) follows from the
extended set of hypotheses.
So far, the textual proof can be summarised in terms of higher-level inference steps
as follows. First, we apply a tactic that eliminates each of the quantifiers for p, a, and
b, transforming them into free variables; for this, there is no corresponding textual state-
ment. Then, we apply a proof by elimination tactic—to prove a statement of the form
A → (B ∨ C), assume A, assume ¬B , and show that C. Subsequently, the resulting con-
junction prime(p) ∧ p | ab is split into its constituents. With these reasoning steps, we
obtain the proof state
Δ ∪ {p∈N, a∈N, b∈N,prime(p),p | ab,¬p | a
}  p | b.
2 To prove a formula of the form ∀x.P (x), one chooses a new variable, which does not occur freely in the
proof context, say x1, and then adopts P(x1) as the new goal. The choice of x1, therefore, does not impose new
restrictions on the range of its possible values. In fact, x1 is regarded as having an arbitrary but fixed value, and
“behaves” like a constant with undetermined value. Proving the goal P(x1) will thus show it to be true for all x.
In this paper, we call variables like x1 free variables.
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to a conjunction of two hypotheses yields:
{
p∈N, a∈N, b∈N,prime(p),p|ab,¬p|a, (a,p) = 1
}  p|b.
The text continues with assertions that are made categorically. Once it is shown that the
greatest common divisor of a and p equals 1, Theorem 24, encoded as Lemma (1) above,
can be used to derive the existential statement that involves the two integers x and y, and
we obtain:
{
p∈N, a∈N, b∈N,prime(p),p|ab,¬p|a,∃x∈Z∃y∈Z . xa + yp = 1
}  p|b.
Apparently, the textbook proof fragment xa+yp = 1 or xab+ypb = b does not constitute
a disjunction, but an inference step of an algebraic nature (both sides of the first equation
are multiplied by b to yield the second equation). For this reasoning step none of the prior
assumptions is used. However, as a prerequisite to this step, the specialisation method
needs to be applied to each of the existential quantifiers (a hypothesis of the form ∃x.P (x)
is replaced by P(x1) where x1 is a newly introduced variable):
{
p∈N, a∈N, b∈N,prime(p),p|ab,¬p|a, x∈Z, y∈Z, xa + yp = 1
}  p|b.
Following the informal proof, we multiply both sides of the equality by b:
{
p∈N, a∈N, b∈N,prime(p),p|ab,¬p|a, x∈Z, y∈Z, xab + ypb = b
}  p|b.
In the last sentence, the authors refer to the assumption p|ab, which suggests its use for
concluding p|b. Since this terminates the proof, the reader may infer that this was the
last obligation to be shown. Formally, Lemma (3) is used twice: p|ab is used to con-
clude p|xab, and p|pb is used to conclude p|ypb. Lemma (4) is applied once, and then
Lemma (5) is applied to finish the proof.
This constitutes our “manual” analysis of Theorem 3’s proof. Our analysis benefited
from the fact that we were able to map the author’s reasoning scheme to the ones we know,
and to fill in gaps or justifications whenever necessary. Also, there was a quite close cor-
respondence between the textual representation of the proof and its (reconstructed) logical
structure. Detecting such correspondence is much harder in the next proof, which high-
lights some of the difficulties that one faces in mechanising the checking of informal
proofs.
3.2. Hardy & Wright’s existence proof
Fig. 2 depicts Hardy & Wright’s first theorem and their proof [21, p. 2]. The main proof
idea is to split up prime factors iteratively. The argument makes use of the fact that the least
divisor of any number is prime. This assertion as well as its proof is embedded. The well-
ordering principle of the natural numbers ensures that the iterative process must eventually
terminate.
Our detailed proof analysis starts with definitions that this argument requires:
Definition 3.1 (divisor). ∀a∈N ∀b∈N .a|b ↔ ¬(a = 0) ∧ ∃c∈N.b = ac ∧ a  b ∧ c b.
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Either n is prime, when there is nothing to prove, or n has divisors
between 1 and n. If m is the least of these divisors, m is prime; for
otherwise
∃l.1 < l < m.l | m;
and
l | m → l | n,
which contradicts the definition of m.
Hence n is prime or divisible by a prime less than n, say p1 in which
case
n = p1n1, 1 < n1 < n.
Here either n1 is prime, in which case the proof is completed, or it is
divisible by a prime p2 less than n1, in which case
n = p1n1 = p1p2n2, 1 < n2 < n1 < n.
Repeating the argument, we obtain a sequence of decreasing numbers
n,n1, . . . , nk−1, . . . , all greater than 1, for each of which the same alter-
native presents itself. Sooner or later we must accept the first alternative,
that nk−1 is a prime, say pk , and then
(1.2.1) n = p1p2 . . . pk .
Fig. 2. Hardy & Wright’s proof of the FTA (existence).
Definition 3.2 (prime). ∀n∈N .prime(n) ↔ n > 1 ∧ ∀d∈N . d|n → d = 1 ∨ d = n.
Definition 3.3 (product of primes). ∀n∈N .pprimes(n) ↔ prime(n) ∨ ∃p1∈N∃n1∈N . n =
p1n1 ∧ p1 < n ∧ n1 < n ∧ prime(p1) ∧ pprimes(n1).
Now, if we render Hardy & Wright’s theorem into a first-order logic formula, we obtain
our initial proof state
Γ ∪ {}  ∀x∈N . x > 1 → pprimes(x),
with the set of formulae Γ containing our definitions and some lemmata (to be disclosed),
as well as an empty set of hypotheses. As we will now demonstrate, constructing a maxi-
mally rigorous proof from Hardy & Wright’s informal proof requires filling in many steps
that they leave unverbalised.
The first proof sentence of Fig. 2 encodes a rather large sequence of elementary reason-
ing steps: it introduces a free variable n and associates it with the notions of prime-hood
and divisibility. First, we need to fill in a reasoning step that introduces such a variable.
Given the initial proof state, we can apply a tactic that eliminates the quantifier and intro-
duces a free variable:
Γ ∪ {n∈N}  n > 1 → pprimes(n).
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of a variable with the same name. Continuing backward reasoning, we can eliminate the
implication to obtain
Γ ∪ {n∈N, n > 1}  pprimes(n).
Again, Hardy & Wright could have made their argument more rigorous by verbalising
these two proof steps more explicitly, say by inserting the statement “Let n be an integer.
Assume n > 1.” or “Let n be an integer such that n > 1.”
The association of the variable n with the predicate prime suggests definitional expan-
sion on pprimes(n) using Definition 3.3, which yields the proof state
Γ ∪ {n∈N, n > 1}  prime(n) ∨ ∃p1∈N∃n1∈N . n = p1n1 ∧ p1 < n
∧ n1 < n ∧ prime(p1) ∧ pprimes(n1).
The interpretation of the first proof sentence, which is a disjunction, also suggests a proof
by cases. Given that the remaining proof obligation is of the form P ∨Q, its underlying line
of reasoning is as follows: if we assume P , then we can rewrite the proof obligation P ∨Q
to  since P entails P ∨Q; and if we assume ¬P , then we can rewrite the proof obligation
P ∨ Q to Q since P ∨ Q, given ¬P , can only be true if Q holds. With P matching the
first disjunct of the remaining proof obligation, and Q as its second disjunct, this formal
reasoning adequately models the proof author’s reasoning. Its first case is linguistically
expressed as “[Either] n is prime, when there is nothing to prove”. We are therefore left
with the second case, symbolically,
Γ ∪ {n∈N, n > 1,¬prime(n)
}  ∃p1∈N∃n1∈N . n = p1n1 ∧ p1 < n
∧ n1 < n ∧ prime(p1) ∧ pprimes(n1).
Now, given this proof state, we need to derive an interpretation for “n has divisors between
1 and n”. Switching to forward reasoning, definitional expansion of prime(n), followed by
some rewriting steps, yields the intended result:
¬prime(n) ↔ ¬(n > 1 ∧ ∀d∈N . d|n → d = 1 ∨ d = n) definition of prime
↔ ¬(n > 1) ∨ ¬∀d∈N . d|n → d = 1 ∨ d = n deMorgan-1
↔ ¬(n > 1) ∨ ¬¬∃d∈N .¬(d|n → d = 1 ∨ d = n) rewrite-∀
↔ ¬(n > 1) ∨ ∃d∈N .¬(d|n → d = 1 ∨ d = n) law of double neg.
↔ ¬(n > 1) ∨ ∃d∈N .¬
(¬d|n ∨ (d = 1 ∨ d = n)) rewrite- →
↔ ¬(n > 1) ∨ ∃d∈N .
(¬¬d|n ∧ ¬(d = 1 ∨ d = n)) deMorgan-2
↔ ¬(n > 1) ∨ ∃d∈N .
(
d|n ∧ ¬(d = 1 ∨ d = n)) law of double neg.
↔ ¬(n > 1) ∨ ∃d∈N . d|n ∧ ¬(d = 1) ∧ ¬(d = n) deMorgan-2
The rewriting of ¬prime(n) continues until the expression is sufficiently simplified and in
an “intuitive” normal form. We obtain the new proof state
C. Zinn / Journal of Applied Logic 4 (2006) 592–621 603Γ ∪ {n∈N, n > 1}
∪ {¬(n > 1) ∨ ∃d∈N . d|n ∧ ¬(d = 1) ∧ ¬(d = n)
}  ∃p1∈N∃n1∈N . n = p1n1
∧ p1 < n
∧ n1 < n
∧ prime(p1)
∧ pprimes(n1).
Now, the set of hypotheses contains formulae of the form A and ¬A ∨ B , which can be
reduced to A and B (with A standing for n > 1) by modus ponens.
The second textbook proof sentence, from “If m is the least of these divisors, . . .” to
“. . . which contradicts the definition of m”, contains a lemma and its proof. Apparently, it
serves to reduce one of the proof obligations, namely prime(p1). As with the first proof
sentence, a set of intermediate steps has to be identified that are not made explicit in the
informal argument.
The linguistic expression “the least of these divisors” suggests a definitional rewriting
of “|” using Definition 3.1. Such forward reasoning results to
Γ ∪ {n∈N, n > 1}
∪ {∃d∈N.¬(d = 0) ∧ (∃c∈N.n = dc ∧ d  n ∧ c n) ∧ ¬(d = 1) ∧ ¬(d = n)
}

∃p1∈N∃n1∈N . n = p1n1 ∧ p1 < n ∧ n1 < n ∧ prime(p1) ∧ pprimes(n1).
Eliminating its two quantifiers with the construction method, the proof obligation can be
reduced to3
n = P1N1 ∧ P1 < n ∧ N1 < n ∧ prime(P1) ∧ pprimes(N1).
Note that P1 and N1 are not actual constructions but meta-variables that will be unified with
these constructions at a later stage. The hypotheses will inform the instantiation process.
Moving forward, we specialise each of the existential quantifiers in the hypotheses, and
split conjunctions into atomic statements:
Γ
n > 1 n = P1N1
n = dc P1 < n
d  n  N1 < n
c n prime(P1)
¬(d = 0) pprimes(N1)
¬(d = 1)
¬(d = n)
We are left with five proof obligations. The obligation n = P1N1 can be resolved by the
hypothesis n = dc, if we instantiate P1 with d and N1 with c. The obligation d < n can be
3 To prove a formula of the form ∃x.P (x), one adopts as a new goal P(t) where t is any term one wishes to
use.
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reduced to true by using n = dc, ¬(d = 1), and Lemma (7) (see below). We are left with
prime(d) and pprimes(c).
(6)∀a∈N∀b∈N . (a  b ∧ ¬a = b) → a < b,
(7)∀a∈N ∀b∈N∀c∈N . (a = bc ∧ ¬b = 1) → c < a.
We have thus made explicit all the intermediate, implicit reasoning steps that allow
for the interpretation of the second proof sentence and the application of the lemma it
contains. In order to perform a detailed logical analysis of the lemma that claims that the
least divisor of any number is prime, we have isolated it from its textbook proof embedding
and proven separately. Let us now analyse this proof. First, we give a formal description of
least_divisor:
Definition 3.4 (least divisor). ∀n∈N∀d∈N . least_divisor(d,n) ↔ d|n ∧ d > 1 ∧ (¬∃c∈N .
c|n ∧ c > 1 ∧ c < d).
Transforming the lemma into its logical form, we obtain the initial proof state
Γ  ∀d∈N∀n∈N . least_divisor(d,n) → prime(d).
After eliminating the quantifiers, we perform a proof by contradiction: to prove A → B ,
we assume A and ¬B and need to derive a contradiction from this:
Γ ∪ {least_divisor(d,n),¬prime(d)}  ⊥.
Forward reasoning by expanding the definition of prime in ¬prime(d), followed by the
same logical rewriting steps as above, yields
Γ ∪ {least_divisor(d,n),¬(d > 1) ∨ ∃x∈N . x|d ∧ ¬(x = 1) ∧ ¬(x = d)
}  ⊥.
Now, if we expand least_divisor(d,n), we obtain
Γ ∪ {d|n ∧ d > 1 ∧ ¬∃c∈N . c|n ∧ c > 1 ∧ c < d,
¬(d > 1) ∨ ∃x∈N . x|d ∧ ¬(x = 1) ∧ ¬(x = d)
}  ⊥.
If we eliminate the existential quantifier in the formula that resulted from expanding
¬prime(n), break-up all the conjunctions, and apply a modus ponens-like inference rule
to eliminate ¬(d > 1), we get the proof state
Γ ∪ {d|n,d > 1,¬(∃c∈N . c|n ∧ c > 1 ∧ c < d), x|d,¬(x = 1),¬(x = d)
}  ⊥.
Since the goal is ⊥, a contradiction must be in the hypotheses. Again, the informal proof
provides guidance. If we can prove ∃c∈N . c|n ∧ c > 1 ∧ c < d from the hypotheses, we
contradict ¬(∃c∈N . c|n ∧ c > 1 ∧ c < d). We get:
{
d|n,d > 1, x|d,¬(x = 1),¬(x = d)}  ∃c . c|n ∧ c > 1 ∧ c < d.
Backward from the new goal, we eliminate the existential quantifier and break apart the
conjunctive statement. This leads to three proof obligations, where C is a meta-variable
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(8)Γ ∪ {d|n,d > 1, x|d,¬(x = 1),¬(x = d)}  C|n,
(9)Γ ∪ {d|n,d > 1, x|d,¬(x = 1),¬(x = d)}  C > 1,
(10)Γ ∪ {d|n,d > 1, x|d,¬(x = 1),¬(x = d)}  C < d.
The first obligation can be resolved, if we instantiate C with d . Given that C = d , we
could also successfully resolve (9), but would fail on the third, since ¬d < d . Instantiating
C with x in (8), we need to prove x|n, which we can obtain with the transitivity of divi-
sor_of —∀a∈N∀b∈N∀c∈N.(a|b ∧ b|c) → a|c. The two remaining proof obligations require
the definitional expansion of x|d using Definition 3.1. If we then eliminate the resulting
quantifier, we obtain:
Γ ∪ {d|n,d > 1,¬(x = 0), d = xy, x  d, y  d,¬(x = 1),¬(x = d)}  x > 1
and
Γ ∪ {d|n,d > 1,¬(x = 0), d = xy, x  d, y  d,¬(x = 1),¬(x = d)}  x < d.
Since ¬(x = 1) and ¬(x = 0), x can only be greater than 1. Combining x  d and ¬(x =
d), we obtain x < d , and we are through.
In the remainder of the proof, Hardy & Wright perform another iteration of their ar-
gument, followed by a paragraph with many linguistic phenomena that complicate any
mechanised analysis. According to our last derived proof state, we are left with the proof
obligation pprimes(n1). Hardy & Wright discharge this goal by using the linguistic con-
structions “repeating the argument” (indicating the iterative nature of their argument),
“sooner or later” (indicating termination), and “the same alternative” as well as “the first
alternative” (indicating a proof by cases for each of the iterations). The richness of its
language as well as the reasoning scheme of iterative argumentation (some form of im-
plicit induction) impose significant challenges to a proof checker; in such cases, proof
authors should be asked to reformulate their proof to a form that is more easily accessible
to computer-assisted formalisation.
3.3. An alternative proof for the existence part of FTA
LeVeque’s existence proof, taken from [27], is depicted in Fig. 3. At first glance, its
underlying reasoning seems to be captured by a standard inductive proof with the base
case a = 2 and the step case from n− 1 to n. However, close inspection reveals a complete
induction, or strong induction. In a standard inductive argument, to prove P(n), one can
only use the assumption P(n − 1); in complete induction, one can assume P(i) for all
n0 < i < n:
(11)∀n∈N .
[(∀k∈N . n0 < k < n → P(k)
)→ P(n)]→ ∀n∈N . P (n).
To prove a formula of the form ∀n∈N . P (n), one can thus prove
(12)∀n∈N .
(∀k∈N . k < n → P(k)
)→ P(n)
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or more primes.
Proof: The theorem is true for a = 2. Assume it to be true for 2,3,4, . . . ,
a−1. If a is prime, we are through. Otherwise a has a divisor different from
1 and a, and we have a = bc, with 1 < b < a, 1 < c < a. The induction
hypothesis then implies that
b =
s∏
i=1
p′i , c =
t∏
i=1
p′′i ,
with p′
i
, p′′
i
primes and hence a = p′1p′2 . . . p′sp′′1 . . . p′′t .
Fig. 3. LeVeque’s proof of the FTA (existence).
and apply modus ponens using (11) and (12). If we apply this reasoning line to the theorem
(after eliminating quantifier and implication sign), we obtain:
{
n∈N,∀k∈N . k < n →
(
k > 1 → pprimes(k))}  n > 1 → pprimes(n).
As complete induction does not require a base case, LeVeque’s first proof sentence is super-
fluous and can be considered—from a logician’s point of view—a flaw in his presentation.
His second textbook sentence, however, fits well the argumentation scheme of complete
induction; it states the induction hypothesis. Since the remaining proof obligation P(n) is
of the form A(n) → B(n), we need to “tidy up” to obtain
{
n∈N,∀k∈N . k < n →
(
k > 1 → pprimes(k)), n > 1}  pprimes(n).
In the third proof sentence, a is predicated with prime indicating a definitional expansion
of product of primes.
Definition 3.5 (product of primes). ∀n∈N .pprimes(n) ↔ prime(n) ∨ ∃p1∈N∃p2∈N . n =
p1p2 ∧ p1 < n ∧ p2 < n ∧ pprimes(p1) ∧ pprimes(p2).
Applying Definition 3.5, we obtain
Γ ∪ {n∈N,∀k∈N . k < n →
(
k > 1 → pprimes(k)), n > 1}

prime(n) ∨ ∃p1∈N∃p2∈N .n = p1p2 ∧ p1 < n ∧ p2 < n ∧ pprimes(p1)∧ pprimes(p2).
The third proof sentence thus introduces a case split, the first case of which is handled
effortlessly. The second case is described by LeVeque’s fourth proof sentence. Forward
reasoning requires the definitional expansion of ¬prime(a) and a subsequent rewriting of
logical signs to transform its definiens into a normal form. The case split is similar to
Hardy & Wright’s, and we thus obtain a quite similar proof state. It differs with respect to
the presence of an induction hypothesis and two obligations of the form pprimes(N):
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(
k > 1 → pprimes(k))}
∪ {∃d∈N.¬(d = 0) ∧ ∃c∈N . n = dc ∧ d  n ∧ c n ∧ ¬(d = 1) ∧ ¬(d = n)
}

∃p1∈N∃p2∈N . n = p1p2 ∧ p1 < n ∧ p2 < n ∧ pprimes(p1) ∧ pprimes(p1).
Similar to Hardy & Wright’s proof, we eliminate all existential quantifiers and break up
the conjunctions:
∀k∈N . k < n →
(
k > 1 → pprimes(k))
n > 1 n = P1P2
n = dc P1 < n
d  n  P2 < n
c n pprimes(P1)
¬(d = 0) pprimes(P2)
¬(d = 1)
¬(d = n)
The formula n = P1P2 can be achieved by instantiating P1 with d and P2 with c, and using
the hypothesis n = dc. The formula d < n is discharged by using the hypotheses d  n,
¬(d = n), and Lemma (6). The obligation c < n can be discharged using n = dc, ¬(d = 1),
and Lemma (7). We are left with the proof obligations pprimes(c) and pprimes(d). Since
d < n, we can apply a form of modus ponens using the induction hypothesis to obtain d >
1 → pprimes(d) in the hypotheses. Because d > 1 can be easily shown, another application
of modus ponens yields pprimes(d) in the list of hypotheses, and the proof obligation
pprimes(d) can be discharged. The same line of reasoning proves pprimes(c).
3.4. Recapitulation
We have studied three textbook proofs with various degrees of difficulty. While the first
proof (Theorem 3) was easy to process, Hardy & Wright’s existence proof had compli-
cating features: an embedded lemma-proof segment, an iterative argument that resisted
formalisation, and a number of complex anaphoric references. In comparison, LeVeque’s
proof of the same theorem was easier to process, although they share many of the reasoning
steps. It was the embedding of these steps within a strong induction schema that facilitated
our analysis. All three proofs demonstrated the use of the expert language of mathematics
to present convincing arguments. In contrast to the controlled languages of Mizar and Isar,
it was found to offer multiple linguistic constructions for expressing the same mathemati-
cal fact or reasoning line; referential expressions (including the use of variable names) to
refer to former statements or parts of the proof, and gaps that are left for the reader to fill. In
the sequel, we will elaborate on two outstanding features of natural-language (NL) proofs.
One of the most prominent features of NL proofs is the use of variables with respect to
naming, quantification, and scope. In Hardy & Wright’s proof of Euclid’s first theorem, all
variables are given names. Moreover, the (implicitly) universally quantified variables p, a,
and b are mirrored by their correspondingly named free variables in the proof. With regard
to quantification, only x and y are explicitly quantified; the scope of each quantifier is left
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unnamed) variable in the theorem statement; the proof reader has to associate the variable
name n as its “corresponding” free variable in the proof. Except for l, none of the other
variables are explicitly quantified, nor is their scope explicitly marked. Within the embed-
ded lemma-proof segment, for instance, the scope of the (implicitly) universally quantified
variable m does not extend beyond the lemma; subsequent uses of m in the lemma’s proof
refer to the corresponding free variable. In LeVeque’s existence proof, the use of a in the
theorem fore-shadows its use as a free variable in the proof. Some intelligence is required
to reconstruct the use of b and c as well as the use of the p′i and p′′i in the product terms.
The proof author’s choice to omit a full specification of their various variable uses (type,
quantification, scope) clearly shortens the text. Proof readers with some expertise will be
able to reconstruct such information with ease.
Another prominent feature of NL proofs is a lack of references to inference rules or
reasoning schemata. In Hardy & Wright’s first proof, there is only one reference to a proof-
external justification (“Theorem 24”). In their second proof, there is an embedded lemma
that is referred to. Here, proof structure is induced by “in which case” and “the same
alternative”, pointing to a proof by cases, whereas “repeating the argument” and “sooner
or later. . . ” signal an iterative argument. The boundaries of such schemes, however, are
not explicitly marked. In LeVeque’s proof, the use of “the induction hypothesis” indicates
an inductive proof; the first proof sentence was misleading to the wrong kind of induction,
however. Also, there is no reference to proof-external theory, although a few lemmata and
definitions were used.
4. A computational framework
In the previous section, we analysed three textbook proofs in great detail. Now, we pro-
pose an algorithm that maps the informal language and reasoning of mathematical proof
onto a formal representation that can be easily verified for correctness. This task natu-
rally divides into two inter-related parts: natural language processing of multi-sentential
discourse and representing its underlying logical structure. Our computational framework
separates those two subtasks as follows. A chart-parser, which covers typical syntactic
constructions of informal proof, processes NL statements at the sentence level. A success-
ful parse returns a syntactic analysis and an underspecified semantic representation, which
contains parts that can only be fully computed in a wider context. Then, a discourse up-
dater attempts to actualise the proof context with the sentence’s contribution. The updater
regards each entity of the sentence representation as referring anaphorically to its place in
the discourse (i.e., proof) context. If the interpretation and integration of semantic units
fail because such links cannot be established (for instance, because there is a gap in the
informal argumentation), a proof planner is called to accommodate the proof context ap-
propriately to allow for the establishment of such links. Both discourse updater and proof
planner operate on the same data structure, a so-called proof representation structure. It en-
riches standard proof state representations with information that facilitates the processing
of language.
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background to discourse representation theory (DRT), the linguistic basis and starting point
of our research. Given the theory’s shortcomings for the representation of highly struc-
tured discourse, we then introduce proof representation structures (PRSs), an extension
that builds on the strengths of DRT, and does away with its shortcomings with regards
to mathematical discourse. In Section 4.2, we discuss the discourse update algorithm and
its semantics/pragmatics interplay with the proof planner. In Section 4.3, we illustrate the
incremental processing of Euclid’s first theorem resulting into PRSs.
4.1. Representation of discourse
Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) provides a systematic approach to represent-
ing and updating discourse context [25,40]. DRT’s underlying insight is that truth does
not only apply to single sentences, but also to multi-sentence discourse; that the sentences
of a discourse are connected to each other; and that they can rarely be interpreted in iso-
lation. DRT’s basic data structure are discourse representation structures (DRS), which
have a two-folded nature: representing content and providing context. In DRT, a multi-
sentence discourse is processed incrementally, sentence by sentence. The first sentence s1
of a discourse is processed in an initial context c0, being somehow provided to the system,
resulting in a new and richer context c1. Each other sentence si of a discourse is processed
in the context ci−1 that has been created by processing the earlier sentences of the dis-
course. The result of processing si is to enrich ci−1 by the semantic contribution of si ,
resulting in a new, and richer ci . The context can be enriched by either adding new dis-
course referents, or new conditions for discourse referents, or both. DRT makes explicit
which kind of linguistic structures introduce new discourse referents, and which kind of
linguistic structures refer to already introduced discourse referents. The resolution of such
references (verbalised as definite descriptions and pronominal anaphora) is governed by a
notion of accessibility that restricts the number of available antecedents. Usually, to link
an anaphoric expression to its antecedent, the purely geometrical concept of accessibility
will be complemented by additional information such as agreement or topic.
DRT is an established theory of discourse processing that accounts for a wide variety of
linguistic phenomena. Its basic rule set provides coverage for a good subset of English. For
the expert language of mathematics, however, we needed to add rules for linguistic con-
structions that mix (verbal) English with (symbolic) mathematical expressions (for details,
cf. [47, Chapter 5]). We now discuss its application to mathematical discourse, but need to
focus on the problematic issues with respect to (logical) structure.
4.1.1. Inadequacy of DRT for mathematical discourse
Although Kamp & Reyle acknowledge the variety of expressions for conditionals in
general forms of discourse, they only give one DRT rule (which they name CR.COND)
for such statements [25, p. 156]. While this rule covers the theorem of Fig. 1—assigning
a DRT-equivalent reading to ∀p∈N∀a∈N∀b∈N . prime(p) ∧ p | ab → p | a ∨ p | b—it fails
on its second if-then surface form conditional. There are two reasons for this failure:
its variables p and a are free—and standard DRT does not provide free variables; and,
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standard DRT’s updater does not provide such readings.
In addition, CR.COND is also triggered by pseudo-conditionals. These statements share
the syntactic form of classical conditionals but have a different semantic and pragmatic
function, as these examples show:
If cis the remainder when n is divided by d and n = zd + c
(13)then c ∈ S and 0 c < d.
(14)If pn is the nth prime then π(pn) = n.
In both examples, we have a “premise” which is not a (logical) assumption. In (13), the
“premise” introduces the name c for an object created by an algebraic operation. In (14),
the nth prime number is given the shorter name pn. The application of CR.COND would
thus provide incorrect readings.
Moreover, standard DRT does not provide propositional discourse entities, a represen-
tational means needed to express logical consequence between conditionals. Such entities
are also necessary to properly handle anaphora that refer to statements (e.g., “the theo-
rem”, “the induction hypothesis”, “the first part of Theorem 20”), sets of statements (e.g.,
“Therefore A”, “It follows that A”), or larger portions of the text (e.g., “the argument”, “the
first alternative”). Because mathematical proof is a highly structured form of discourse
(e.g., in a proof by cases, the initiating assumption of the first case cannot be used for the
derivation of statements in the second case), its adequate representation requires a language
that allows for the expression of such structures. As a result, we have extended discourse
representation structures to proof representation structures (PRSs), which we will discuss
next.
4.1.2. Proof representation structures
Fig. 4 shows the first few PRS lines for Hardy & Wright’s proof of Theorem 3. A PRS
line is a quintuple [α,β, γ,μ, ν] such that α is the line’s number, β is a discourse marker
of the set {thm(Nr),ind_base_case,ind_hyp,fst_case, . . .}, γ is a modality of
— — let p ∈ N be universally quantified —
— — let a ∈ N be universally quantified —
— — let b ∈ N be universally quantified —
thm thm(3) goal prime(p) ∧ div(p, times(a, b)) → div(p, a) ∨ div(p, b) —
1 — — — (choose/3, thm(3))
1.1 — let p ∈ N be arbitrary —
1.2 — let a ∈ N be arbitrary —
1.3 — let b ∈ N be arbitrary —
1.4 — goal prime(p) ∧ div(p, times(a, b)) → div(p, a) ∨ div(p, b) —
1.5 — — — (elim_1, 1.4)
1.5.1 — assp prime(p) ∧ div(p, times(a, b)) —
1.5.2 — assp ¬div(p, a) —
1.5.3 — goal div(p, b) —
1.5.4 — then not_divides(p, a) (notation, 1.5.2)
1.5.5 — then prime(p) (and, 1.5.1)
1.5.6 — then divides(p, times(a, b)) (and, 1.5.1)
1.5.7 — then (a,p) = 1 (lem_gcd, 1.5.5, 1.5.4)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fig. 4. The first few lines of a PRS for Theorem 3.
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markers provide a non-numeric way to refer to parts of the PRS. During proof verifica-
tion, these markers are exploited to resolve referring expressions used by proof authors
(e.g., “Theorem 3”, “the induction hypothesis”, “the first case”). All discourse markers but
thm(Nr) are introduced by proof plan schemata (see below). A PRS line can have one of
four possible modalities. A PRS line marked with let introduces new referents (constants
and variables) to the discourse; a line marked with assp adds a new assumption to the
hypotheses; a line marked with then enriches the context with a derived statement (re-
sulting from forward reasoning); and a PRS line marked with goal classifies its content
as a proof obligation (backward reasoning).
The accessibility of discourse referents and conditions is imposed by a numbering
scheme that is defined over a partially ordered set of abstract discourse referents. A PRS
line with line number α1 is accessible by a PRS line with line number α2 if and only if α1
is a proper prefix of α2 or the following two conditions hold: (i) the suffix following the
maximal common prefix α1 ∧ α2 in α1 consists of only one letter, and (ii) the first symbol
after the maximal common prefix α1 ∧ α2 is smaller in α1 than in α2. For details, see [47,
Chapter 6]. In our example, the accessibility relation is rather trivial. Take the condition
labelled 1.5.6, which contains the referents p, a, and b. Their quantification is determined
by the closest accessible let constructions that introduce these names: p gets its binding
from PRS line 1.1, a from PRS line 1.2, and b from PRS line 1.3. For justifying the propo-
sitional part of 1.5.6, all formulae of all prior PRS lines with modalities assp and then
are accessible.
4.2. A discourse updater for the construction of PRSs
The result of the linguistic analysis, based upon an adapted version of DRT (and per-
formed by a DCG-based chart parser) is an underspecified semantic representation. Each
such intermediate representation that is passed to the discourse updater is then interpreted
and incorporated into a proof representation structure that captures the current proof con-
text. Fig. 5 depicts a high-level view of the discourse update algorithm. The algorithm’s
main predicate is prs_update; it has three input parameter (marked with +) and one out-
prs_update(+TRS, +PRS, +DRS, -NewPRS) :-
add_drs_to_prs(TRS, PRS, DRS, NewPRS).
prs_update(+TRS, +PRS, +DRS, -NewPRS) :-
accommodate_proof_context(TRS, PRS, PRS1),
prs_update(TRS, PRS1, DRS, NewPRS).
accommodate_proof_context(+TRS, +PRS, -NewPRS) :-
do_backward_reasoning(TRS, PRS, NewPRS)
;
do_forward_reasoning(TRS, PRS, NewPRS).
Fig. 5. The discourse update algorithm (in Prolog notation).
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succeeds if its subgoal add_drs_to_prs succeeds; otherwise the second clause of
prs_update is tried. The interpretation and integration of a DRS is non-trivial. The
predicate add_drs_to_prs interprets the discourse representation structure DRSwithin
the proof context PRS and the domain theory TRS. The integration of a DRS into a proof
context consists of linking its discourse referents and its discourse conditions to the corre-
sponding ones in the PRS, regarding each DRS entity as anaphoric to its place in the proof
context. If these links cannot be established, then the proof context has to be accommo-
dated to provide such links. This behaviour is ensured by Prolog’s backtracking behaviour;
if the first clause of the predicate prs_update fails, then its second clause is activated.
A call to the predicate accommodate_proof_context extends a proof context PRS
into a context PRS1 in an attempt to allow for the integration of the given DRS in the sub-
sequent, recursive call to prs_update. The discourse updater’s accommodation clause
makes use of a self-built, simple pragmatic component, the proof planner. The proof con-
text can be extended by reasoning forward from accessible PRS proof lines of modality
assp and then, as well as by reasoning backward from an open goal obligation PRS line.
The proof planner is informed by two sources: a theory representation structure (TRS)
that captures number-theoretical knowledge, and a set of proof plan schemata that model
meta-mathematical expertise.
Fig. 6 depicts five proof plan schemata encoding argumentation schemes for induction,
choose, →- and ∨-elimination, and a proof by cases.
Proof plan schemata are represented as underspecified proof representation struc-
tures. The schema for induction, for instance, introduces the five underspecified abstract
discourse entities X, X.1, X.2, X.3, X.4, the discourse markers ind_base_case,
proof_by_induction, and ind_hyp, the discourse referent n, the assumption P(n)
as well as the proof obligations P(n0) and P(n + 1). The schema is applicable for the-
orems of the form ∀n∈N.n > n0 → P(n). When applied and introduced into the context,
its content becomes fully instantiated. Note that the accessibility relation imposed by the
numbering scheme in the proof by cases prevents any part of the second case to access any
parts of the first case.
4.3. An example processing
In this subsection, we now apply our computational framework to Hardy & Wright’s
first proof (cf. Fig. 1). We start the discussion with the first proof sentence, assuming that
both chart parser and discourse updater were successful in parsing the theorem sentence,
resulting in the following PRS:
— — let p ∈ N be universally quantified —
— — let a ∈ N be universally quantified —
— — let b ∈ N be universally quantified —
thm thm(3) goal prime(p) ∧ div(p, times(a, b)) → div(p, a) ∨ div(p, b) —
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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X proof_by_induction — — (ind_1, Line)
X.1 ind_base_case goal P(n0) —
X.2 — let n ∈ N be arbitrary —
X.3 ind_hyp assp P(n) —
X.4 — goal P(n + 1) —
∀x∈N∀y∈N∀z∈N.P (x, y, z)
X — — — (choose/3, Line)
X.1 — let x ∈ N be arbitrary —
X.2 — let y ∈ N be arbitrary —
X.3 — let z ∈ N be arbitrary —
X.4 — goal P(x, y, z) —
A → B
X — — — (impl_elim, Line)
X.1 — assp A —
X.2 — goal B —
A → (B1 ∨ B2)
X — — — (elim_1, Line)
X.1 — assp A —
X.2 — assp ¬B1 —
X.3 — goal B2 —
A1 ∨ A2 → B
X proof_by_cases — — (cases, Line)
X.1 fst_case — — —
X.1.1 — assp A1 —
X.1.2 — goal B —
X.2 snd_case — — —
X.2.1 — assp A2 —
X.2.2 — goal B —
Fig. 6. Proof plan schemata as underspecified proof representation structures.
For the proof sentence, our chart-parser returns the following discourse representation
structure (DRS):
π5 :
v8∈N
name(v8,p), v8
.=?
prime(v8)
π6 :
v9∈N , v10∈N , v11∈N, r2∈N , times∈(N→N)→N
name(v9,p), v9
.=?, name(v10, a), v10 .=?
name(v11, b), v11
.=?, r2 = times(v10, v11)
div(v9, r2)
assp(π5 ∧ π6)
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with the names p, a, and b to the respective variables in the PRS.4 We are thus left with
the remaining condition of π5 (prime(p)) and π6 (p|ab) such that assp(π5 ∧π6). However,
the current proof context does not have such a condition, and therefore, such linking cannot
be established, and the first clause of prs_update fails. As a result, the discourse updater
falls into the second clause of prs_update to accommodate the proof context.
The proof planner first attempts to develop the proof context by reasoning backward.
The closest accessible PRS goal line is identified, and the bindings for each of its free
variables determined. For the “remaining” proof obligation
∀a∈N∀b∈N∀p∈N.prime(p) ∧ div
(
p, times(a, b)
)→ div(p, a) ∨ div(p, b),
which is the theorem statement, several proof plan schemata are found to be applicable,
e.g., proof by choose/3 method, proof by natural induction, and proof by Nœtherian in-
duction. One possible accommodation of the proof context, the application of the schema
choose/3, yields:
— — let p ∈ N be universally quantified —
— — let a ∈ N be universally quantified —
— — let b ∈ N be universally quantified —
thm thm(3) goal prime(p) ∧ div(p, times(a, b)) → div(p, a) ∨ div(p, b) —
1 — — — (choose/3, thm)
1.1 — let p ∈ N be arbitrary —
1.2 — let a ∈ N be arbitrary —
1.3 — let b ∈ N be arbitrary —
1.4 — goal prime(p) ∧ div(p, times(a, b)) → div(p, a) ∨ div(p, b) —
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
With the accommodated proof context, we then call prs_update to re-attempt the in-
tegration of our DRS. Now, each of its three named DRS referents p, a and b are bound
to the free variables p, a, and b of the current PRS. However, the discourse updater still
fails to integrate the assumption prime(p)∧div(p, times(a, b)), and therefore another PRS
accommodation, jumping into the second clause of prs_update, is initiated. Now, rea-
soning backward, we get the open proof obligation
prime(p) ∧ div(p, times(a, b))→ div(p, a) ∨ div(p, b),
where each of its variables is free; an application of the impl_elim method allows for the
integration of prime(p) ∧ div(p, times(a, b)), and we obtain:
1.5 — — — (impl_elim, 1.4)
1.5.1 — assp prime(p) ∧ div(p, times(a, b)) —
1.5.2 — goal div(p, a) ∨ div(p, b) —
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 Also, the integration of the entities r2 and times proceeds successfully; for a more detailed description, cf.
[47, Chapter 7].
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time, each of the three named referents as well as its complex assumption can be success-
fully linked to the proof context. This completes the processing of the first proof sentence,
for now.
The sentence-level representation of the proof’s second if-then conditional is:
¬
v12∈N , v13∈N
name(v12,p), v12
.=?
name(v13, a), v13
.=?
div(v12, v13)
→
1∈N, v14∈N , v15∈N, r3∈N , gcd∈(N→N)→N
name(v14, a), v14
.=?
name(v15,p), v15
.=?
r3 = gcd(v14, v15), fun_result(r3)
equal(r3,1)
.
While discourse update succeeds with respect to the incorporation of the named discourse
referents p, a, and b, it fails linking the representation for p/| a to its place in the proof con-
text. Therefore, the accommodation predicate must be invoked. However, the proof planner
fails to return a continuation of the current PRS that allows for the interpretation and inte-
gration of p/| a. Consequently, this PRS must be abandoned altogether, and another PRS
continuation from a previous PRS has to be sought. Backtracking within prs_update
initiates the reprocessing of the DRS that lead to its construction. Now, to incorporate the
first proof sentence, an applicable proof method other than impl_elim, namely, a proof by
elimination method is found, and we obtain:
1.5 — — — (elim_1, 1.4)
1.5.1 — assp prime(p) ∧ div(p, times(a, b)) —
1.5.2 — assp ¬div(p, a) —
1.5.3 — goal div(p, b) —
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
This proof continuation allows for the integration of the first sentence and provides a suc-
cessful basis for the second; after more proof planning, we obtain the PRS shown in Fig. 4.
5. Related work
5.1. Previous attempts towards the checking of informal proofs
Abrahams’ Proofchecker In the first half of the 1960s, one of McCarthy’s students, Paul
Abrahams, was asked to implement a Lisp program for the machine verification of mathe-
matical proofs. The program, named Proofchecker, “was primarily directed towards the
verification of textbook proofs, i.e., proofs resembling those that normally appear in mathe-
matical textbooks and journals” [1]. But Abrahams soon needed to revise his goal. If, wrote
Abrahams, “a computer were to check a textbook proof verbatim, it would require far more
intelligence than is possible with the current state of the programming art”. Therefore, “the
user must create a rigorous, i.e., completely formalised, proof that he believes represents
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proof”. Henceforth, Abrahams programmed a computer to check rigorous proofs. Instead
of processing textbook proofs, he defined a formal language and a restricted set of proof
construction commands; Proofchecker then checked if a given input satisfied these formal
requirements. In his conclusions, Abrahams claims that “it is a trivial task to program a
computer to check a rigorous proof; however, it not a trivial task to create such a proof
from a textbook proof” [1].
There has been research studying the design of rigorous (i.e., formal) proof languages
since. Besides the aforementioned (declarative) proof languages Mizar and Isar, there are
proposals for such controlled languages by Barendregt [4], Nederpelt and Kamareddine
[24,31], and Ranta and colleagues [19].
Simon’s Nthchecker Simon reports the first, serious, and for its time pioneering work
towards the automatic understanding of informal proofs [37]. Simon’s motivation has been
twofold: (i) extend the power of a theorem prover by limiting the search space—it is an
informal proof of the conjecture that directs the proof search; and (ii) build a system that
understands natural language in the limited domain of informal proofs in number theory.
Simon’s Nthchecker transforms an informal proof into a formal proof in four phases.
First, a lexical analysis component tokenises an input string into a sequence of words,
terms, and formulae, and determines sentence boundaries as well. Then, a sentence parser
processes individual sentences using a unification-based grammar and constructs their
semantic representation with a frame-based approach. Then, a proof connector scans a
sequence of semantic representations for keywords (e.g., “if”, “and”, “consider”), and
transforms it into a tree structure using an operator precedence parser. Subsequently, the
resulting tree is refined into a formal proof using a natural deduction prover.
Our main critique of Simon’s work is that he fails to seriously address both linguistic
and mathematical issues. Simon neither adopts a linguistic theory, nor a theory to model the
kind of reasoning patterns one encounters in textbook proofs. Consequently, Nthchecker’s
capabilities in handling linguistic phenomena or to follow the proof author’s argumentation
line are limited.
Saarland University’s DIALOG project The DIALOG project aims at supporting proof
construction with natural-language tutorial dialogue. A Wizard of Oz study between 24
students and a mathematician, who mimicked or simulated the dialogue system, resulted
in a valuable corpus of one-to-one interactions in the domain of naive set theory [6]. An
analysis of this corpus of human-oriented interactive proofs showed many similarities to
our analysis of textbook proofs. Both the authors of textbook proofs and the subjects in
the DIALOG study omit information that a proof development system (e.g., Mizar or Coq)
would expect from a user when constructing a formal proof. Both groups underspecify
the content of proof steps as well as their underlying intention or use in the proof con-
text. For example, it is often left unspecified whether a proof step results from forward
reasoning (that is, whether it is a logical consequence of hypotheses or derived facts) or
backward reasoning (that is, whether it relates to a proof obligation). Another omission,
common two both corpora, is the incompleteness of a proof step’s justification, that is,
missing references to inference rules or assertions. Also, the use of variables, and vari-
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text understander constitutes highly polished mathematical arguments, the dialogue and
proof manager that is being built in the DIALOG project [7] faces additional challenges:
the student’s proof step may be incorrect, correct but irrelevant, or may resist a syntactic,
semantic or pragmatic analysis. The interpretation of student input and the generation of
system feedback requires to bridge the gap between informal proof, as communicated by
humans, and formal proof, as constructed by proof systems [3]. Studies of human–human
communication in the domain of informal proofs have the potential to have some impact
on the design and implementation of logical calculi, search and control algorithms, and the
presentation of proofs.
5.2. Linguistic phenomena
Most of the phenomena discussed in this paper have been noticed before, of course.
Reconsider, for example, the second proof sentence of Theorem 3, the conditional “If p/| a
then (a,p) = 1”. Our logical-mathematical analysis showed that the premise p/| a is added
to the discourse context to later justify the conclusion (a,p) = 1 as well as subsequent
proof statements. The fact that conditionals can introduce assumptions has been observed
(and given a DRT treatment) by several authors (cf. Roberts [35] and Frank and Kamp
[18], among others). Roberts gives the following two pairs of sentences:
(1a) If Edna forgets to fill the birdfeeder, she will feel very bad.
(1b) The birds will get hungry.
(2a) If John bought a book, he’ll be home reading it by now.
(2b) It’ll be a murder mystery.
In the first pair, intuitively, (1b) is not a categorical assertion; it is only asserted as following
from the antecedent of (1a). The same is true for (2b) with respect to (2a). Moreover,
sentence (2b) contains an anaphoric expression that has its antecedent introduced by the
premise of (2a). Both phenomena occur in a combined manner when we have a referring
expression that has a proposition (or a set thereof) as an antecedent.
Sentences of the form “Therefore A” are anaphoric in character, referring to a propo-
sition (or a set thereof) that allows one to conclude A. This pragmatic use of “therefore”
has been studied by Webber et al. who show that discourse adverbials (like “therefore”,
“but”, “then”, “so”) “make an anaphoric, rather than a structural, connection with the pre-
vious discourse” [42]. They function anaphorically to pick up a salient proposition from
the discourse context.
5.3. Discourse understanding as inferring rhetorical relations
Work on generating human-readable, natural language proofs from machine-generated
formal proofs shows the necessity to abstract from “obvious” steps in the formal proofs
and to identify their underlying main argumentation (e.g., Fiedler’s doctoral dissertation
[17], and the generation module of the tactics-based prover Nuprl [22]). In addition, one
might argue that proof verbalisation techniques yield more natural and readable proofs
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the case of interpreting natural language proofs, one might argue that their “translation”,
or refinement, into formal proofs requires inferring their rhetorical relations. However, it
is unclear whether discourse relations other than logical consequence (for example, ex-
planation, elaboration, narration, or background) do appear in textbook proofs. Usually,
mathematical proofs do not contain temporal relations, and postulating the presence of
events may be criticised as pushing it too far. Of course, proof authors make use of dis-
course markers that help structuring the argument. However, note that the use of “but” in
Euclid’s first theorem does not indicate contrast, but reminds the reader of a proposition
that has been introduced as an assumption at an earlier proof stage. This is not to say that
the cue “but” cannot be used to mark contrast, say, in a reductio ad absurdum argument. In
our approach, however, this is captured in purely logical terms.
5.4. On representation
In our approach, we construct a proof object, represented as a proof representation struc-
ture, as the representation of the informal proof. At the same time, we treat the proof object
as a mathematical argument that the informal proof describes and that parts of this dis-
course therefore refer to. It is the discourse updater that regards each DRS entity of a DRS-
based representation of each proof sentence as anaphoric to its place in the proof object.
Proof representation structures are richer than the data structures used by proof planning
systems. The added features (e.g., numbering scheme, discourse markers) were necessary
to facilitate the processing of (some of the) linguistic phenomena that occur in informal
mathematical arguments. In this respect, the work of Ferguson and Allen about plan rep-
resentation in mixed-initiative planning (several participants cooperate to develop plans) is
particularly interesting [16]. They found, through the collection and analysis of empirical
data, that “in no case did one agent simply describe the plan by describing a sequence of
actions”. Instead, users “identified the overall goals, identified subgoals to focus on, iden-
tified important actions in the plan, stated relevant facts that would help the development
of the plan, identified problems with what the other agent proposed, confirmed what the
other agents suggested, and requested clarification were not fully understood”. Moreover,
Ferguson and Allen point out that “many of the details of the plan are never mentioned at
all, and yet are implicitly agreed upon by the agents”. Thus, it is clear that a STRIPS repre-
sentation of plans is inadequate for supporting the communication about plans. A planning
system that engages in a mixed-initiative dialogue with human users must thus use a richer
data structure, extending the representation of a plan as a sequence of actions.
6. Discussion and future work
Despite of the tremendous progress in computer-assisted theorem proving and the ex-
istence of many sophisticated proof environments, mathematicians rarely use computer
support for proving theorems. This is in stark contrast to computer algebra systems, which
are now widely used in mathematical practise. One reason for their acceptance is that cal-
culation is often considered routine work instead of creative activity. A mathematician is
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result has been computed. But mathematical proof is richer than algebraic computation,
and guarantee must be complemented by explanation.
In this paper, we argued that the key to user acceptance lies in both the reasoning
and the language that math assistant systems provide. In line with McCarthy [29], Wang
[41], and deBruijn [13], we envision a mathematician–machine communication, where
the human presents a mathematical proof—one that could equally be communicated suc-
cinctly between experts, and where the machine then tries to “understand” the language
and reasoning of such mathematical arguments to construct a corresponding formal proof
that satisfies correctness. If existent proof environments, which are strong on the reason-
ing side, could be extended to allow for more expressive proof representation languages,
their usability would be greatly improved. As a matter of fact, such intelligent proof en-
vironments do not need to have full natural language capabilities. If the machine proof
reader has difficulties with either language or reasoning, it could, very similar to a stu-
dent, ask for reformulation (in case of insufficient language understanding), clarification
(in case of ambiguity), or argument refinement (in case of improper or unknown justifica-
tion).
Vip is the implementation of our computational framework. At the time of writing, Vip
can only process Hardy & Wright’s proof of Euclid’s first theorem (Fig. 1) and LeVe-
que’s existence proof of the FTA (Fig. 3). Vip is thus a proof of concept rather than a
usable system ready for deployment. We have laid a solid groundwork and demonstrated
that its key technology works. Apart from enriching Vip’s knowledge sources with addi-
tional linguistic, mathematical, and meta-mathematical content, future work includes the
replacement of our poor man’s proof planner with an interface to an off-the-shelves proof
planner, preferably IsaPlanner, as well as the support of natural language verbalisation.
IsaPlanner would give us access to a well-maintained and increasing library of formalised
plan schemata and to the respective proof planner. Such a replacement would require a
major change to Vip’s discourse updater, which would then be required either to map a
PRS into the (now external) planner’s proof state (and vice versa), or to directly operate
on the (now external) planner’s proof state. This is a non-trivial question and relates to our
discussion in Section 5.4. The addition of a verbalisation component would greatly facili-
tate the user’s understanding of Vip’s proof checking outcome. Currently, a PRS in Prolog
notation is returned as a result of Vip’s interpretation of the input. It is desirable to devise
and implement a verbalisation algorithm that takes the output PRS and converts it into a
corresponding natural language proof. The generated natural language proof can then be
compared to the input textbook proof that Vip had analysed to construct the PRS in the first
place.
The development of a text understander for informal proofs is a challenging task, for
both the disciplines of automated reasoning and computational linguistics. We believe,
however, that mathematical proofs constitute one of the best text genres to overcome the
major obstacle, namely to effectively support interpretation with the exploitation of extra-
linguistic knowledge (e.g., domain knowledge, conventions in text composition, logical
structure). The reported research is a step toward the realisation of such a system.
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